> Windows Syscalls
ntoskrnl.exeT1622T1057T1106

NtQueryInformationProcess

Retrieves a class of information about a process — the universal back-end of GetProcessInformation and the workhorse of anti-debug checks.

Prototype

NTSTATUS NtQueryInformationProcess(
  HANDLE           ProcessHandle,
  PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass,
  PVOID            ProcessInformation,
  ULONG            ProcessInformationLength,
  PULONG           ReturnLength
);

Arguments

NameTypeDirDescription
ProcessHandleHANDLEinHandle to the target process. Required access depends on the class (often PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION).
ProcessInformationClassPROCESSINFOCLASSinEnum selecting the information class. Notable: ProcessBasicInformation=0, ProcessDebugPort=7, ProcessWow64Information=26, ProcessImageFileName=27, ProcessDebugObjectHandle=30, ProcessDebugFlags=31, ProcessProtectionInformation=61.
ProcessInformationPVOIDoutCaller-supplied buffer that receives the requested class data. Layout varies per class.
ProcessInformationLengthULONGinSize in bytes of the ProcessInformation buffer.
ReturnLengthPULONGoutOptional pointer that receives the number of bytes written (or required, on STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH).

Syscall IDs by Windows version

Windows versionSyscall IDBuild
Win10 15070x19win10-1507
Win10 16070x19win10-1607
Win10 17030x19win10-1703
Win10 17090x19win10-1709
Win10 18030x19win10-1803
Win10 18090x19win10-1809
Win10 19030x19win10-1903
Win10 19090x19win10-1909
Win10 20040x19win10-2004
Win10 20H20x19win10-20h2
Win10 21H10x19win10-21h1
Win10 21H20x19win10-21h2
Win10 22H20x19win10-22h2
Win11 21H20x19win11-21h2
Win11 22H20x19win11-22h2
Win11 23H20x19win11-23h2
Win11 24H20x19win11-24h2
Server 20160x19winserver-2016
Server 20190x19winserver-2019
Server 20220x19winserver-2022
Server 20250x19winserver-2025

Kernel module

ntoskrnl.exeNtQueryInformationProcess

Related APIs

GetProcessInformationIsDebuggerPresentCheckRemoteDebuggerPresentNtSetInformationProcessNtQuerySystemInformationGetProcessImageFileNameW

Syscall stub

4C 8B D1            mov r10, rcx
B8 19 00 00 00      mov eax, 0x19
F6 04 25 08 03 FE 7F 01   test byte ptr [0x7FFE0308], 1
75 03               jne short +3
0F 05               syscall
C3                  ret
CD 2E               int 2Eh
C3                  ret

Undocumented notes

NtQueryInformationProcess is one of the most overloaded syscalls in Windows: more than 100 PROCESSINFOCLASS values are defined across modern builds, ranging from harmless (ProcessTimes=4, ProcessHandleCount=20) to deeply security-relevant (ProcessDebugPort=7, ProcessDebugObjectHandle=30, ProcessDebugFlags=31, ProcessMitigationPolicy=52, ProcessProtectionInformation=61, ProcessImageFileName=27). The SSN itself is rock-stable at 0x19 since Windows 10 1507 — Microsoft has carefully held this slot because so much in-tree and third-party code calls it. The class number space, however, churns frequently; values added in 24H2 are not present in 1809 and will return STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS on older kernels.

Common malware usage

The single most-called anti-debug primitive on Windows. ProcessDebugPort (7) returns a non-zero handle when a usermode debugger is attached — used by IsDebuggerPresent's NTDLL-based replacements and most commercial protectors (VMProtect, Themida, Enigma). ProcessDebugObjectHandle (30) returns the DebugObject directly — required because experienced analysts NULL out the legacy DebugPort. ProcessDebugFlags (31) returns the inverse of NoDebugInherit; reading 0 means a debugger has been attached at some point. Combined: a pattern of three back-to-back NtQueryInformationProcess calls with classes 7, 30, 31 against NtCurrentProcess() is an almost certain anti-debug fingerprint. Loaders also use ProcessBasicInformation (0) to obtain PEB and walk loaded modules without touching the obvious LdrEnumerateLoadedModules; ProcessImageFileName (27) is used for sandbox/emulator name checks.

Detection opportunities

Volume is huge — this syscall fires constantly in normal operation, so raw counts are useless. Differentiation comes from (a) the class used, (b) the target handle (self vs. remote), and (c) call sequencing. ETW Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls does *not* surface class — you need a user-mode shim (ntdll inline hook, ETW provider per-class) or a kernel callback. Detection rule of thumb: any process that calls classes 7, 30, 31 in close succession against itself is performing anti-debug. EDRs that care about this generally instrument the dispatch via instrumentation callbacks (PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine + NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessInstrumentationCallback)) or via TI-ETW EtwTiLogReadWriteVm-style hooks on adjacent operations.

Direct syscall examples

cTriple-class anti-debug check

// The canonical anti-debug fingerprint: classes 7, 30, 31 against self.
HANDLE hProc = NtCurrentProcess();
DWORD_PTR debugPort = 0;
HANDLE    debugObj  = NULL;
ULONG     debugFlags = 0;
ULONG ret;

NtQueryInformationProcess(hProc, ProcessDebugPort,         &debugPort, sizeof(debugPort), &ret);
NtQueryInformationProcess(hProc, ProcessDebugObjectHandle, &debugObj,  sizeof(debugObj),  &ret);
NtQueryInformationProcess(hProc, ProcessDebugFlags,        &debugFlags, sizeof(debugFlags), &ret);

if (debugPort != 0 || debugObj != NULL || debugFlags == 0) {
    // Debugger present (or has been). Bail.
    NtTerminateProcess(hProc, 0);
}

cPEB walk via ProcessBasicInformation

PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION pbi = { 0 };
ULONG ret;
NtQueryInformationProcess(NtCurrentProcess(),
                          ProcessBasicInformation,
                          &pbi, sizeof(pbi), &ret);
PPEB peb = pbi.PebBaseAddress;
// Now walk peb->Ldr->InMemoryOrderModuleList to enumerate modules
// without calling LdrEnumerateLoadedModules / EnumProcessModules.

asmx64 stub (stable across builds)

; SSN 0x19 — stable Win10 1507 .. Win11 24H2.
NtQueryInformationProcess PROC
    mov  r10, rcx
    mov  eax, 19h
    syscall
    ret
NtQueryInformationProcess ENDP

MITRE ATT&CK mappings

Last verified: 2026-05-20