NtRequestPort
Sends a fire-and-forget LPC message on a connected port — no reply expected.
Prototype
NTSTATUS NtRequestPort( HANDLE PortHandle, PPORT_MESSAGE RequestMessage );
Arguments
| Name | Type | Dir | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PortHandle | HANDLE | in | Handle to a connected LPC port previously returned by NtConnectPort / NtSecureConnectPort. |
| RequestMessage | PPORT_MESSAGE | in | PORT_MESSAGE header followed by inline payload (≤ 256 bytes); enqueued at server then call returns. |
Syscall IDs by Windows version
| Windows version | Syscall ID | Build |
|---|---|---|
| Win10 1507 | 0x15D | win10-1507 |
| Win10 1607 | 0x164 | win10-1607 |
| Win10 1703 | 0x16A | win10-1703 |
| Win10 1709 | 0x16D | win10-1709 |
| Win10 1803 | 0x16F | win10-1803 |
| Win10 1809 | 0x170 | win10-1809 |
| Win10 1903 | 0x171 | win10-1903 |
| Win10 1909 | 0x171 | win10-1909 |
| Win10 2004 | 0x177 | win10-2004 |
| Win10 20H2 | 0x177 | win10-20h2 |
| Win10 21H1 | 0x177 | win10-21h1 |
| Win10 21H2 | 0x179 | win10-21h2 |
| Win10 22H2 | 0x179 | win10-22h2 |
| Win11 21H2 | 0x181 | win11-21h2 |
| Win11 22H2 | 0x184 | win11-22h2 |
| Win11 23H2 | 0x184 | win11-23h2 |
| Win11 24H2 | 0x186 | win11-24h2 |
| Server 2016 | 0x164 | winserver-2016 |
| Server 2019 | 0x170 | winserver-2019 |
| Server 2022 | 0x17F | winserver-2022 |
| Server 2025 | 0x186 | winserver-2025 |
Kernel module
Related APIs
Syscall stub
4C 8B D1 mov r10, rcx B8 86 01 00 00 mov eax, 0x186 F6 04 25 08 03 FE 7F 01 test byte ptr [0x7FFE0308], 1 75 03 jne short +3 0F 05 syscall C3 ret CD 2E int 2Eh C3 ret
Undocumented notes
NtRequestPort is the asynchronous, no-reply variant of NtRequestWaitReplyPort on the legacy **LPC** path. The kernel copies the inline PORT_MESSAGE into the receiver's port queue and returns immediately — the caller never blocks for a server response. It is typically used for one-way notifications (e.g. CSRSS event posting on pre-Vista builds). Inline payload is capped at PORT_MAXIMUM_MESSAGE_LENGTH (256 bytes); larger payloads require a previously-negotiated PORT_VIEW shared section.
Common malware usage
On modern Windows, malware use of NtRequestPort is *negligible*. Historically a few pre-Vista user-mode rootkits employed it as a one-way fan-out signal (e.g. notify a co-resident component to flip state) precisely because no Win32 wrapper exists and userspace tooling rarely surfaces LPC traffic. Today an attacker who wants this semantic uses NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort with `ALPC_MSGFLG_RELEASE_MESSAGE`, a writable mailslot, or a named-pipe write. Any raw LPC request from an unsigned process is in itself anomalous and worth chasing.
Detection opportunities
There is no dedicated ETW provider for legacy LPC equivalent to `Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ALPC`. Kernel-mode EDRs can hook the syscall directly; user-mode EDRs hook `ntdll!NtRequestPort`. The legitimate-caller baseline on Windows 10/11 is essentially zero (almost nothing inbox still uses raw LPC), so *any* hit from an unsigned or sandboxed process is high signal. WinObj reveals live port objects but not in-flight messages.
Direct syscall examples
asmx64 direct stub
; Direct syscall stub for NtRequestPort (SSN 0x186 on Win11 24H2)
NtRequestPort PROC
mov r10, rcx ; PortHandle
mov eax, 186h ; SSN — verify per-build
syscall
ret
NtRequestPort ENDPcFire-and-forget LPC datagram
// Send a one-way LPC message on a connected port.
#include <windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *pNtRequestPort)(HANDLE, PVOID /*PPORT_MESSAGE*/);
NTSTATUS LpcNotify(HANDLE hPort, void *msgBuf) {
pNtRequestPort fn = (pNtRequestPort)GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtRequestPort");
return fn(hPort, msgBuf); // returns once the kernel queues the message
}MITRE ATT&CK mappings
Last verified: 2026-05-20